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Abstract 
This paper deals with tax policy responses to inequality aversion by examining the first-best 
Pareto-efficient marginal tax structure when people are inequality averse. In doing so, we 
distinguish between four different and widely used models of inequality aversion. The results 
show that empirically and experimentally quantified degrees of inequality aversion have 
potentially very strong implications for Pareto-efficient marginal income taxation. It also 
turns out that the exact type of inequality aversion (self-centered vs. non-self-centered), and 
the measures of inequality used, matter a great deal. For example, based on simulation results 
mimicking the disposable income distribution in the US in 2013, the preferences suggested by 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) imply monotonically increasing marginal income taxes, with large 
negative marginal tax rates for low-income individuals and large positive marginal tax rates 
for high-income individuals. In contrast, the often considered similar model by Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2000) implies close to zero marginal income tax rates for all.       
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1. Introduction 
 
There are several reasons for a government to tax its citizens, including redistribution 
objectives and revenue collection to fund public expenditure. Most optimal tax models 
dealing with income redistribution assume that the government wants to redistribute from the 
well-off to the not so well-off, e.g., since low-income individuals are assumed to have higher 
marginal utility of consumption than high-income ones. We then often say that the 
government or the social planner is inequality averse.  
 
At the same time, individuals are generally not assumed to care about inequality per se in 
models dealing with public policy. That is, their utility is typically modeled to depend solely 
on their own private and public consumption, as well as on their own leisure time, and hence 
not on any measure of inequality. This is despite the fact that much experimental research 
suggests that people are inequality averse, in the sense that they prefer a more equitable 
allocation to an allocation that is in their own narrow material self-interest; see, e.g., Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).
1
 In the present paper we will take this 
experimental evidence seriously and assume that people do not only derive utility from their 
own consumption and leisure time (as in standard models of optimal taxation) but also prefer 
a more equal distribution of consumption to a less equal one, ceteris paribus.  
 
The purpose of the present paper is twofold: First, the paper derives and examines the first-
best optimal tax policy rules for different kinds of inequality aversion. In doing so, we 
distinguish between self-centered inequality aversion (where each individual’s aversion to 
inequality is based on a comparison between his/her own consumption and other people’s 
consumption) and non-self-centered inequality aversion. We will consider two kinds of self-
centered inequality aversion, based on Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels 
(2000), respectively, and two kinds of non-self-centered inequality aversion, where individual 
utilities depend on the Gini-coefficient and the coefficient of variation, respectively. 
 
                                                          
1 There is of course also much other empirical evidence for other-regarding behavior, for example with respect to 
tax compliance (Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann, 1996, Andreoni et al., 1998;), voting behavior and 
political preferences (Mueller, 1998; Fong, 2001; Carlsson et al., 2010), and charitable giving (List, 2011; 
Andreoni and Payne, 2013). 
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Second, the paper illustrates quantitatively, based on numerical simulations mimicking the 
disposable income distribution in the U.S. in 2013, how these types of inequality aversion 
affect the structure of first-best marginal income taxation. In doing so, we start from a realistic 
distribution of the disposable income and assume that this income distribution is optimal from 
the perspective of the government. That is, we will assume that the observed income 
distribution is the result of an optimal tax policy of the government. In turn, the government is 
assumed to maximize a Paretian social welfare function where the utility of individuals with 
different wage levels are given different weights, which are implicitly defined by the resulting 
income distribution. By combining the social and private first-order conditions, based on 
utility functions characterized with different kinds of inequality aversion, we are then finally 
able to quantitatively calculate optimal marginal income tax rates and find that theyI in 
general vary with the before-tax income levels.
2
  
 
As far as we know, our study is the first to derive efficient income tax policies based on 
models where people are inequality averse. This is in sharp contrast to the by now rich 
literature on various aspects of optimal taxation based on another kind of interdependent 
utility structure where people instead of caring about inequality have preferences regarding 
their own relative consumption or relative income. That is, people prefer to have more than 
others and dislike having less. This literature shows that relative consumption concerns have 
profound effects on the optimal tax structure by implying much higher marginal labor income 
and/or commodity tax rates than in standard models, as well as justifies capital income 
taxation both on efficiency grounds and for redistributive reasons.
3
 Although there are 
                                                          
2
 An alternative approach would be to start with an exogenous ability distribution, together with an ethically 
motivated SWF, and the same utility functions as in the present paper. One could then derive the socially optimal 
disposable income distribution, as well as the optimal marginal tax rates and lump-sum taxes consistent with this 
disposable income distribution. We did not pursue this approach for two related reasons: First, if we would start 
with an ethically motivated SWF, it would presumably be weakly concave in individual utilities. This, together 
with concave utility functions in private consumption, would imply a very equitable distribution of disposable 
income also without taking equity preferences into account; if anything, low-ability individuals would 
presumably have higher levels of disposable income. Second, while inequality aversion would affect the optimal 
allocation, the insights from such modification would say little about inequality aversion in economies with the 
large inequalities we observe in all existing market economies.       
3
 This literature includes Boskin and Sheshinski (1978), Oswald (1983), Frank (1985a, b, 2005, 2008), Tuomala 
(1990), Persson (1995), Corneo and Jeanne (1997), Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), Ireland (2001), Dupor and Liu 
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important similarities between preferences based on inequality aversion and preferences 
regarding relative consumption, since the individuals’ consumption choices generate 
externalities in both cases, there are important differences too. In particular, when people care 
about their consumption compared with others, they typically impose negative externalities on 
one another. When people are inequality averse, on the other hand, the consumption 
externalities may be either positive or negative, depending on whether an increase in a 
particular individual’s consumption contributes to increase or decrease the inequality that 
other people care about. As we will see below, the latter also implies that the tax policy 
implications may differ considerably between different kinds of inequality aversion.   
 
In the present paper, we focus on efficiency aspects of inequality aversion, i.e., the tax policy 
responses that these aspects motivate. This means that we (implicitly) assume that the 
government can observe individual ability and thus use ability-specific lump-sum taxes for 
purposes of redistribution. Obviously, we do not propose that governments in reality can 
implement first-best policies consistent with their SWF. Nevertheless, we believe that the 
approach taken here has important advantages. First, it allows for a simple characterization of 
the marginal tax policy incentives caused by inequality aversion per se(and the corresponding 
externalities), since all analyses below presuppose that inequality aversion is the only reason 
for distorting the labor-leisure choice. The insights gained from such a study are particularly 
useful in this case since there are no earlier studies dealing with the tax policy implications of 
consumer aversion to inequality. Second, since we aim at examining several different 
measures of inequality, it admits a straightforward comparison of social costs and corrective 
tax policies between inequality measures. This aim further emphasizes the need for a simple 
baseline model.  
 
Section 2 presents a continuous-type model and derives the choice rule for Pareto-efficient 
marginal income taxation for a very general measure of consumption inequality. Based on the 
results in Section 2, we derive efficient marginal tax rates for two different versions of self-
centered inequality aversion in Section 3, namely the ones proposed by Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), respectively. As explained above, by “self-centered” 
we mean measures of inequality that are defined as relations between the individual’s own 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(2003), Abel (2005), Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008, 2010, 2015), Wendner (2010, 2014), Alvarez-
Cuadrado and Long (2011, 2012), Eckerstorfer and Wendner (2013), and Kanbur and Tuomala (2014). 
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consumption and others’ consumption. Despite that the two models are quite similar, their 
policy implications are surprisingly different, which is particularly clear from the numerical 
simulations. Section 4 similarly analyzes efficient taxation in economies with non-self-
centered inequality aversion, where individuals are inequality averse based on the Gini 
coefficient and the coefficient of variation, respectively. Section 5 concludes that 
experimentally estimated parameters of inequality aversion, if generalized to the overall 
economy, may indeed motivate substantial marginal income taxes. Yet, it is also demonstrated 
that the exact nature of the inequality aversion measure has profound implications for the 
efficient marginal income tax structure. Proofs are presented in the Appendix.   
 
 
2. Pareto Efficiency and Inequality Aversion 
 
Suppose we have a continuous ability distribution without bunching and holes. The 
government wants to maximize a social welfare function 
 
max
min
( ) ( )
w
w
W u w h w dw  ,                    (1) 
where  u   denotes the utility function, which is common to all individuals, and     
constitutes an increasing transformation of individual utility. We do not assume that this 
transformation is necessarily concave. In fact, we will rather (implicitly) assume that it often 
gives a higher weight to the utility of high-ability individuals. As such, a natural interpretation 
is that it reflects the outcome of a political process where different individuals or groups have 
different bargaining power. We also assume that each individual cares about the distribution 
of consumption, but not about the distribution of utility or leisure. Therefore, even though 
low-ability individuals may dislike the governmental objective function, all individuals will, 
conditional of this objective function, agree that there are good reasons to obtain a Pareto-
efficient allocation. Thus, for any distribution of negotiating power in the economy, all 
individuals agree that Pareto improvements should be made, and hence that the allocation 
should be Pareto efficient.
4
 
 
                                                          
4
 Had we instead restricted     to be a concave transformation, a first-best allocation would not generally 
imply that higher-ability individuals have higher consumption in equilibrium. 
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Let us assume that the ability distribution results in a continuous equilibrium distribution for 
private consumption, such that higher ability will always result in higher consumption in 
equilibrium. We can then write the social objective function as 
 
max
min
( , , ) ( )
c
c
W u c z C f c dc  ,                   (2) 
where c is own consumption, z is own leisure, and C  is a (possibly type-specific) measure of 
the overall consumption distribution (which we will specify further subsequently). Without 
loss of generality, we normalize the population size to unity such that 
max max
min min
( ) ( ) 1
w c
w c
h w dw f c dc   . 
 
Individual Behavior 
Each individual treats C  as exogenous and chooses private consumption, c , and work hours, 
1l z  , to maximize utility, ( , , )u c z C , subject to his/her budget constraint. For an individual  
of ability w, the budget constraint is given by 
( )c wl T wl  ,                    (3) 
where ( )T wl  denotes the individual’s tax payment (positive or negative). The individual first-
order conditions for consumption and work hours can then be combined as follows: 
 
1
1 '( )
czMRS
w T wl


,                    (4) 
where '( )T wl  denotes the marginal income tax rate and the left-hand side is the marginal rate 
of substitution between the individual’s own private consumption and leisure, i.e., 
( , , ) ( , , )
cz
u c z C u c z C
MRS
c z
 

 
. 
 
Social Decision Problem 
The social optimization problem means choosing private consumption and leisure time (or 
work hours) for each individual to maximize the social welfare function given in equation (2) 
subject to a resource constraint for the economy as a whole. In doing so, the social planner 
also recognizes the relationship between each individual’s consumption, c, and the measure of 
the overall distribution of consumption, C. This implies the following Lagrangean: 
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 
max max max
min min min
( , , ) ( ) (1 ( )) ( ) ( )
c w c
c w c
u c z C f c dc w z w h w dw c f c dc 
 
   
 
 
   .                (5) 
The expression in brackets in the second part of (5) is the resource constraint, implying that 
output (or before-tax income) equals private consumption at the aggregate level. Consider the 
social first-order conditions with respect to consumption and leisure, respectively, for 
individuals with consumption level c , for whom the associated level of leisure and type-
specific measure of the overall consumption distribution are z  and C , respectively. These 
social first-order conditions can be written as 
max
min
( , , ) ( , , )
' ( ) ' ( ) ( )
c
c
u c z C C u c z C
f c dc f c f c
C c c
  
  
 
  
,                   (6) 
( , , )
' ( ) ( )
u c z C
f c wf c
z
 



,                   (7) 
where '
( , , )
d
du c z C

  . 
 
We are now ready to characterize the optimal marginal tax policy for the model set out above, 
in which we have made no assumption about the preferences with respect to inequality 
aversion (other than that C might be type specific). This general characterization will be very 
useful in later parts of the paper, where the tax policy implications of more specific forms of 
inequality aversion are addressed. Let 
( , , )
1
( )
( , , )( )
u c z C C
C cMWTP c
u c z Cf c
c
 
  


                   (8) 
denote the marginal willingness to pay of an individual with consumption level c  for 
individuals with consumption level c  to reduce their consumption.
5
 We can then derive the 
following result by combining the private and social first-order conditions in equations (4), 
(6), and (7):   
 
                                                          
5
 The normalization choice of consumption for one individual is made for convenience, is harmless and could be 
replaced by any number, despite the fact that it may seem a bit strange since the overall population is normalized 
to one. 
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Lemma 1. The Pareto-efficient marginal income tax rate implemented for individuals with 
gross income wl and consumption c is given by 
max
min
1 '( )
'( ) ( ) ( )
1 '( )
c
c
T wl
T wl MWTP c f c dc
T wl



.                  (9) 
 
This tax formula looks almost like a conventional Pigouvian tax, i.e., the sum of all other 
people’s marginal willingness to pay for keeping individuals with  gross income wl and 
consumption c  from consuming one additional unit. The only difference is the weight factor 
   1 '( ) / 1 '( )T wl T wl   attached to the measure of marginal willingness to pay on the right-
hand side.  
 
To see the rationale behind this weight factor, consider first the logic behind a conventional 
first-best tax for an externality-generating good. In this case, the discrepancy between the 
social and private marginal value, as reflected by the externality-correcting tax, simply 
consists of the sum of other people’s marginal willingness to pay for the individual not to 
consume one additional unit of the good. This would have been the case here as well had the 
first term on the left-hand side of equation (6) been the same for everybody, i.e., if the 
externality were atmospheric.
6
 In general, however, the externality examined here is non-
atmospheric, meaning that the externality generated by consuming one additional unit will 
typically differ depending on who consumes it. In this case, the social first-order condition 
does not imply equalization of the social marginal utility of consumption among consumers, 
i.e., that ' ( , , ) /u c z C c    should be the same for all consumption (and hence ability) levels. 
Instead, as revealed from (6), what should be equalized is ' ( , , ) /u c z C c    plus a term that 
reflects the value of the marginal externality that the individual’s consumption imposes on 
other people. This, in turn, means that the social marginal utility of consumption is larger at 
the optimum for individuals whose consumption generates large negative externalities and 
vice versa, which explains the weight factor.  
 
Note that equation (9) can alternatively be written as 
                                                          
6
 A similar result would follow if we were to introduce a numeraire good that does not generate externalities. 
The reason is that a government that maximizes a social welfare function and is able to redistribute without any 
social cost will equalize the social marginal utility of consumption of the numeraire good among individuals. 
9 
 
 
max
min
'( ) ( )
( )
1 '( )1 '( )
c
c
T wl MWTP c
f c dc
T wlT wl

 
. 
Hence, the ratio of the marginal tax rate to the part of the additional income that is not taxed 
away equals the sum (measured over all individuals) of the ratio of the marginal willingness 
to pay to the fraction of the marginal income that is not taxed away. The marginal income tax 
rate faced by individuals with before-tax wage rate w  and associated consumption c  is thus 
interpretable to depend on other people’s marginal willingness to pay measured in terms of 
their gross income.
7
  
 
An analytically useful special case of equation (9) arises when all marginal income tax rates 
are small enough, yet not necessarily similar, such that  
 
1 '( )
1
1 '( )
T wl
T wl



, 
in which it is possible to obtain an algebraic closed-form solution.
8
 In this case, the marginal 
tax rate faced by an individual of ability w  and consumption c  can be approximated as 
 
max
min
'( ) ( ) ( )
c
c
T wl MWTP c f c dc  .                 (10) 
The Pareto-efficient marginal income tax rate implemented for any individual would in this 
case simply equal the sum of all people’s marginal willingness to pay for this particular 
individual to reduce his/her consumption. 
 
 
  
                                                          
7
 Yet another way to write the tax formula is in terms of a marginal rate of substitution between C and z, i.e.,   
max
min
'( ) ( , , ) / /
( )
( , , ) / ( )1 '( )
c
c
T wl u c z C C C c
w f c dc
u c z C z f cT wl
   
 
  
.  
The integrand is interpretable as the value of leisure that an individual with ability w is willing to sacrifice for an 
individual with ability w  to decrease his/her consumption marginally. 
8
 Note that equation (10) is not a reduced form, since  c  depends on '( )T wl . Note also that the assumption that 
all marginal tax rates are low does not mean that their relative size is similar. Instead, since the externalities are 
generally non-atmospheric, their relative size may vary greatly and some optimal marginal tax rates may be 
negative while others are positive. 
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3. Marginal Income Taxation under Self-Centered Inequality Aversion 
 
In the previous section, we derived general expressions for Pareto-efficient marginal taxation 
when people are inequality averse, or more generally when the utility of each individual 
depends on the consumption of all individuals. Yet, we have not further explored the 
determination of the marginal willingness to pay (WTP) measures per se. This is the task of 
the present section, where we will explore the marginal WTPs on the right-hand side of 
equations (9) and (10) based on the two most famous models of self-centered inequality 
aversion, namely those suggested by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels 
(2000), and then illustrate how the Pareto-efficient marginal income taxes will vary with the 
gross income based on a realistic distribution of consumption. We assume that this 
distribution is the result of a Pareto-efficient income tax policy, including an efficient set of 
type-specific lump-sum taxes. We can then calculate what the marginal income tax rates must 
be for a continuum of consumption levels under different assumptions about the structure and 
magnitude of the inequality aversion.   
 
3.1 The Fehr-Schmidt Model 
 
Let us start with the model suggested by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), which has become 
something of an industry standard in the context of self-centered inequality aversion. This is 
presumably due to a combination of a high degree of parsimony, since the model is based on 
only two parameters, and the model’s ability to rather well explain the outcomes of many 
experimental games. 
  
While the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model is most often used in settings with either two or 
few individuals, it is straightforward to generalize it to a continuous distribution of 
individuals. The utility of an individual with consumption c can then be written as 
 
 
max
min
max
min
( , , ) , , ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,
cc
c c
cc
c c
u c z C u c z c c f c dc c c f c dc
v c C z v c c c f c dc c c f c dc z
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
.  (11) 
The parameters 0   and 0   are interpretable to reflect the strengths of the aversion to 
inequality that is to the individual’s material advantage and disadvantage, respectively.  
11 
 
 
Based on this type of inequality aversion, we can evaluate the marginal WTP measures in the 
general policy rule for Pareto-efficient marginal income taxation presented in Lemma 1 and 
immediately obtain the following result:   
 
Proposition 1. Based on the Fehr and Schmidt type of inequality aversion, the Pareto efficient 
marginal income tax rate implemented for individuals with gross income wl and consumption 
c is given by 
 
max
min
1 '( ) 1 '( )
'( ) ( ) ( )
1 '( ) 1 '( )
cc
c c
T wl T wl
T wl f c dc f c dc
T wl T wl
 
 
 
  
.               (12) 
 
Equation (12) is clearly an implicit formulation since the Pareto-efficient marginal income tax 
implemented for gross income wl  is expressed in terms of the Pareto-efficient marginal 
income taxes for all consumption levels. Consequently, it is not straightforward to interpret 
the policy rule. In particular, it is not apparent how the marginal income tax rate varies in the 
consumption distribution, or even how it relates to the consumption rank. We will deal with 
this limitation in two ways. First we will present the results of the special case given in 
equation (10), where all marginal tax rates are small enough to imply that the weight factor 
   1 '( ) / 1 '( )T wl T wl   is negligible. We will then present simulation results based on the 
general case. 
 
The special case where all marginal tax rates are small results in a much simpler efficiency 
marginal tax rule, as follows:  
 
Corollary 1. If all marginal income tax rates are small, then based on the Fehr and Schmidt 
type of inequality aversion the Pareto-efficient marginal income tax rate implemented for 
individuals with gross income wl and consumption c is given by 
 '( ) ( )Rank( )T wl c      .                 (13) 
 
Equation (13) implies that the Pareto-efficient marginal income tax rate increases in the 
consumption rank, and that this relationship is affine. The Pareto-efficient marginal tax for the 
lowest consumption level (where Rank( ) 0%c  ) is given by min'( )T w l   , whereas the 
12 
 
Pareto-efficient marginal tax for the highest consumption level (where Rank( ) 100%c  ) is 
given by max'( )T w l  . Thus, the Pareto-efficient marginal tax rate increases monotonically 
from   for the individual with the lowest consumption to   for the individual with the 
highest consumption. While the efficient marginal tax rate increases linearly in the 
consumption rank, it typically increases nonlinearly with the consumption level, where the 
specific pattern depends on the resulting consumption distribution in the population.  
 
To illustrate how the Pareto-efficient marginal tax rates vary with consumption in the general 
case where the marginal tax rates are not necessarily low, we will make use of numerical 
simulations, for which we have to make some further assumptions. In particular, the results 
will depend on the resulting consumption distribution. Let us take the disposable income in 
the U.S. in 2013 as a point of departure. According to the Luxemburg Income Study (LIS), 
the mean disposable income per (equivalence-scale adjusted) capita was 39,322 USD in that 
year, and the corresponding Gini coefficient was 0.377. For convenience, we will here 
approximate the actual distribution with a log-normal one, such that mean disposable income 
and the Gini coefficient equal the above values.
9
 Moreover, we will assume that the 
consumption distribution equals the disposable income distribution. Although the results 
naturally depend on these distributional assumptions, most qualitative insights remain the 
same for other realistic distributions. We will use the same distributional assumption 
throughout this paper, i.e., also for other measures of inequality.  
 
We must also make parametric assumptions within the Fehr and Schmidt model of inequality 
aversion. In accordance with Fehr and Schmidt (1999, p. 844), who based their own judgment 
on ample experimental evidence, we first assume that 0.85   and 0.315  . These 
parameter values clearly imply substantial marginal tax rates, suggesting that we cannot rely 
on equation (13) as a good approximation of the Pareto-efficient marginal tax policy. Indeed, 
whereas the distribution based on the simplified equation (13) implies a marginal tax range 
from -0.315 to 0.85, the efficient marginal tax distribution according to equation (12) ranges 
from approximately -0.6 to 0.5, as can be seen in Figure 1 below.  
 
                                                          
9
 We also have data on the 10th percentile, the median, and the 90th percentile. Our lognormal approximation is 
reasonably good (for our purposes) also for these values. 
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Figure 1. Pareto-efficient marginal income tax rates as a function of the consumption levels 
(for the log-normal consumption distribution discussed above) in equilibrium, based on the 
Fehr and Schmidt model of inequity aversion. FS: 0.85  , 0.315  ; FS/2: 0.425  , 
0.15075  ; FS/4: 0.2125  , 0.075375  . 
 
Overall, the Pareto-efficient marginal income tax rates are substantial (recall that we assume 
that the disposable income distribution is the outcome of an optimal government tax policy, 
i.e., that the government maximizes eq. (2)). Furthermore, the marginal tax rate increases 
(quite sharply) up to a certain consumption (and thus income) level and then remains fairly 
constant. Low levels of income should be subsidized in response to inequality aversion. Note 
also that this qualitative pattern remains the same even if we assume half or a quarter of the 
values of   and   suggested by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), as can be seen in the figure. 
 
3.2 The Bolton-Ockenfels Model 
 
The second most often referred to model of self-centered inequality aversion is the one 
suggested by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). While also this model is typically used in settings 
with either two or few individuals (as the Fehr and Schmidt model), the utility function can, 
of course, be written in the same way in a continuous-type framework. By using c  to denote 
the average consumption, the utility function is given as 
-80
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( , , ) , ,
c
u c z C u c z
c
 
  
 
,                  (14) 
where 0
( / )
u
c c



 for c c , 0
( / )
u
c c



 for c c , and 0
( / )
u
c c



 for c c . 
 
Thus, an individual prefers that the average consumption level is as close as possible to 
his/her own consumption level, ceteris paribus. Based on equation (14) we can immediately 
derive the following measure of marginal WTP by using equation (8): 
2
( , , )
( )
( , , )
u c z C
c CMWTP c MWTP
u c z Cc
c

 


,                 (15) 
which is clearly independent of c . This marginal WTP thus reflects how much an individual 
with consumption level c is willing to pay for a decrease in any individual’s consumption. In 
other words, while an individual’s marginal willingness to pay is positive if the average 
income is higher than the individual’s own income, and vice versa, it is independent of which 
individual the potential consumption change refers to. Consequently, the consumption 
externality that inequality aversion gives rise to is atmospheric in this case, since each 
individual cares only about the average consumption, in addition to his/her own consumption 
and leisure. We can then derive a closed-form solution to the Pareto-efficient tax problem also 
in the general case, when the marginal tax rates are not low. Lemma 1 and equation (15) 
imply the following result:  
 
Proposition 2. Based on the Bolton and Ockenfels’ type of inequality aversion, the Pareto-
efficient marginal income tax rate implemented for individuals with gross income wl and 
consumption c is given by 
 
max max
min min
2
1 ( , , ) ( , , )
'( ) ( ) ( )
c c
c c
u c z C u c z C
T wl c f c dc MWTP f c dc
C cc
  
  
  
  .      (16) 
 
Equation (16) implies that the Pareto-efficient marginal tax income tax rate is the same for all, 
irrespective of consumption level. The intuition is as follows: Each individual derives 
disutility if his/her consumption deviates from the average consumption in the economy as a 
whole, ceteris paribus. This means that an individual with a consumption level below the 
mean will prefer that others reduce their consumption. Yet, this individual is indifferent 
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regarding exactly who reduces his/her consumption. Hence, the individual’s marginal WTP is 
the same for a reduction by the rich as for an equally large reduction by the poor. Similarly, 
an individual above the mean would prefer that others increase their consumption, and he/she 
would be willing to pay the same amount to a rich and a poor individual for a given 
consumption increase. The resulting Pareto-efficient marginal tax rate will then reflect the net 
effect of such positive and negative marginal WTPs. While this Pareto-efficient marginal tax 
rate is not generally strictly equal to zero, it will presumably be very close to zero in most 
cases.  
 
In order to shed more light on the order of magnitude of the Pareto-efficient marginal tax rate, 
let us consider a more specific version of the Bolton and Ockenfels preferences as follows: 
2 2
1
( , , ) 1 , 1 ,
c
u c z C v c z v c z
C c
 
      
                    
.               (17) 
Using this utility function in equation (16), one can show that 
max
min
1
'( ) 2 1 ( )
c
c
c
T wl f c dc
c c

 
  
 
 .                 (18) 
Equation (18) implies that the marginal tax rate is the same for all individuals (the intuition 
for which we discussed above), and also that it is proportional to a parameter measuring the 
strength of the aversion against inequality,  . By using simulations based on the same 
consumption distribution as in the Fehr and Schmidt model examined above, the resulting 
Pareto-efficient marginal tax rate turns out to be very close to zero for all reasonable values of 
 . Overall, the policy implications in terms of Pareto-efficient taxation turn out to be 
strikingly different between the Fehr-Schmidt and the Bolton-Ockenfels models.   
 
 
4. Marginal Income Taxation under Non-Self-Centered Inequality Aversion 
 
Although much work on social preferences has focused on self-centered inequality aversion, 
one may question such a point of departure in a many-individual society. In particular, an 
individual may prefer a more equal consumption distribution to a less equal one regardless of 
the relationship between his/her own consumption and that of others. For example, an 
individual may prefer a society with fewer super-rich and fewer super-poor persons regardless 
of the individual’s own consumption level and his/her consumption rank and relative 
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consumption compared to others. In this section we explore the marginal WTPs in equations 
(9) and (10) based on different models of non-self-centered(or general) inequality aversion. 
This means that the inequality measure is the same for all individuals such that 
/ /C c C c      for all C. 
 
We consider two such measures of inequality, the Gini coefficient and the coefficient of 
variation, as the basis for studying the optimal tax policy responses to inequality aversion. We 
will for ease of comparability in each case consider a Cobb-Douglas specification of the 
relationship between the individual’s own consumption and the measure of inequality, 
following Carlsson et al. (2005). For each measure of inequality, we can then write the utility 
function as   
 ( , , ) ( ) ,u c z C v c C z ,                  (19) 
where 0   is a parameter reflecting the degree of inequality aversion. Thus, an individual 
always prefers less to more general inequality, regardless of the relation between the 
individual’s own consumption and that of others.  
 
4.1 Gini Coefficient 
 
Let us start with the most commonly used inequality measure on the social level, namely the 
Gini coefficient, G, such that C G  in (19). The Gini coefficient is half of the relative mean 
absolute consumption difference, which in turn is defined as the ratio of the mean absolute 
consumption difference, D, to the mean consumption. Therefore, 0.5 /G D c , where 
0 0 0
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
c
c
D f c f c c c dcdc f c f c c c dcdc
  
       . 
Based on this measure of inequality, we can derive the marginal WTP measures used to form 
the marginal tax policy rules in equations (9) and (10).   
 
Let us start with the general case where the marginal taxes are not necessarily small, implying 
the following result: 
 
Proposition 3. For the model of inequality aversion based on the Gini coefficient, the Pareto-
efficient marginal income tax rate implemented for individuals with gross income wl and 
consumption c is given by 
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  
max
min
1 '( )
'( ) 2Rank( ) 1 ( )
1 '( )
c
c
T wl
T wl c G c f c dc
D T wl
 
  

.               (20) 
 
Again there is no closed-form algebraic solution in the general case. However, we can easily 
calculate the critical levels for when the marginal income tax is positive and when it is 
negative. From (20) it clearly follows that '( ) 0T wl   for Rank( ) 0.5 / 2c D c   and also 
that '( ) 0T wl   for Rank( ) 0.5 / 2c D c   and '( ) 0T wl   for Rank( ) 0.5 / 2c D c  . 
 
Let us next turn to the simplified case where all marginal income tax rates are low, as given in 
equation (10), where we instead obtain a closed-form solution as follows: 
 
Corollary 2. If all marginal income tax rates are low, and if the inequality aversion is based 
on the Gini coefficient, the Pareto-efficient marginal income tax rate implemented for 
individuals with gross income wl and consumption c is given by 
  '( ) 2Rank( ) 1T wl c G
G

   .                 (21) 
Equation (21) is reminiscent of equation (13), i.e., the corresponding marginal tax policy 
derived under the Fehr and Schmidt type of inequality aversion, and we can observe a 
monotonically increasing affine relationship between marginal tax rates and consumption 
(and hence also a monotonic relation with gross income, by assumption). The marginal tax 
rate will start from ( 1) / 0G G    for the individual with the lowest consumption rank and 
end with (1 ) / 0G G    for the individual with the highest consumption rank. The intuition 
is that all individuals would benefit from a more equal consumption distribution, ceteris 
paribus, which can be accomplished through increased consumption in the lower end of the 
distribution and decreased consumption in the upper end. Since marginal taxation affects the 
before-tax income via the labor supply decision, the tendency to supply too much labor in the 
upper end of the distribution and too little labor in the lower end is counteracted through this 
marginal tax policy. 
 
Returning to the general case, where we do not assume low marginal tax rates, next consider 
simulations based on the same consumption distribution as before, with a Gini coefficient 
equal to 0.33, and hence a relative mean absolute consumption difference of 0.66. The results 
are presented in Figure 2. As expected from the qualitative analysis above, the Pareto-efficient 
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marginal tax rates vary with the (optimal) consumption level in the same general way as for 
the Fehr and Schmidt type of inequality aversion. This means that the non-self-centered 
inequality aversion discussed here may have tax policy implications qualitatively similar to 
those associated with self-centered inequality aversion, even if the levels of marginal taxation 
differ between Figures 1 and 2.  
 
 
Figure 2. Pareto-efficient marginal income tax rates as a function of the consumption levels 
(for a log-normal consumption distribution) in equilibrium, based on non-self-centered 
inequality aversion where inequality is measured as the Gini coefficient.   
 
4.2 Coefficient of Variation 
 
Consider next what is presumably the second most commonly used general inequality 
measure, namely the coefficient of variation, V, defined as the ratio of the standard deviation 
of the consumption distribution in the population,  , to mean consumption, c , such that 
/C V c  . Carlsson et al. (2005) analyze and parameterize this measure of inequality 
based on a questionnaire-experimental approach. They conclude that the mean degree of 
inequality aversion is such that 0.2   in equation (19).                                                                                                                                                                                                         
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In the general case, where the marginal taxes are not necessarily low, the utility function in 
equation (19) and Lemma 1 imply the following result: 
 
Proposition 4. For the model of inequality aversion based on the coefficient of variation, the 
Pareto-efficient marginal income tax rate implemented for individuals with gross income wl
and consumption c is given by 
 
max
min
2
1 1 '( )
'( ) ( )
1 '( )
c
c
c c T wl
T wl c f c dc
c T wl


  
  
 
 .                (22) 
 
As expected, there is no closed-form algebraic solution here either. However, before turning 
to simulations, we can easily derive the marginal income tax rates for the lowest and highest 
possible consumption levels. When the consumption of the taxed individual approaches zero, 
we obtain the following from (22): 
 
max
min
2
1 1 '( )
lim '( ) ( ) 0
1 '( )
0
c
c
c T wl
T wl c f c dc
c T wl
c


 
    
 

 .               (23) 
For a sufficiently large  , this means  
 
max
min
2
'( ) 1
lim ( ) 1
1 '( )1 '( )
0
c
c
T wl c c
f c dc
c T wlT wl
c


 
     
  

 . 
Therefore, by the mean value theorem, there exists a * 0c  such that 
 lim '( )
*
T wl
c c
 

. 
In other words, there is a positive consumption level at which the marginal income tax rate 
approaches minus infinity. The intuition is that, based on this measure of inequality aversion, 
it is simply not possible to obtain consumption levels below *c  as a part of a Pareto-efficient 
allocation, regardless of the social welfare function (as long as it is Paretian). The reason is 
that at this consumption level the social value of increased consumption is positive even if 
society puts no weight whatsoever on the utility of individuals with consumption *c . 
Similarly, when consumption (and hence gross income) approaches infinity, we obtain: 
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max
min
max
min
2 2
2
'( ) 1 1
lim ( )
1 '( )1 '( )
( )
1 '( )
c
c
c
c
T wl c c
c f c dc
c cc T wlT wl
c
c
c f c dc
T wl

 


 
   
  
 
  



.               (24) 
This, in turn, clearly implies that  
 lim '( ) 1T wl
c


, 
i.e., the marginal income tax rate approaches 100% when consumption goes to infinity.  
 
Moreover, it is straightforward to obtain the critical levels for when the marginal income tax 
is positive and when it is negative. From (23), it clearly follows that '( ) 0T wl   for 
 2 1c c    and also that '( ) 0T wl   for  2 1c c    and '( ) 0T wl   for  2 1c c   . 
In the simplified case where all marginal income tax rates are small, we obtain a closed-form 
solution summarized as follows: 
 
Corollary 3. If all marginal income tax rates are small, and if the inequality aversion is 
based on the coefficient of variation, the Pareto-efficient marginal income tax rate 
implemented for individuals with gross income wl and consumption c is given by 
 
2
1
'( ) 1
c c
T wl
c V

 
  
 
.                (25) 
 
Again we can observe a monotonic positive relationship between the marginal tax rates and 
consumption, starting from  21/ 1V   for 0c  . The intuition is of course the same as for 
the marginal policy implied by equation (21), where the inequality aversion is based on the 
Gini coefficient.  
 
The simulation in Figure 3 below shows the efficient marginal tax rates for different 
inequality parameters  , based on the same distributional assumptions as before for the 
general case (without assuming small marginal tax rates). We can observe that the Pareto-
efficient marginal tax rates vary strongly with the consumption level, that it may become very 
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high at non-extreme consumption levels, and that it can take extreme negative values for low 
levels of consumption. Indeed, it can be shown that the case with  0.3   implies that the 
Pareto-efficient marginal tax approaches minus infinity for a positive consumption level. 
Despite level differences, however, the general pattern in Figure 3 resembles that in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 3. Pareto-efficient marginal income tax rates as a function of the consumption levels 
(for a log-normal consumption distribution) in equilibrium, based on non-self-centered 
inequality aversion where inequality is measured as the coefficient of variation.   
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
As far as we know, this is the first paper to analyze Pareto-efficient marginal income taxation 
in economies where people are inequality averse. We started by examining a general model, 
in which we made no other assumption about the inequality aversion other than that people 
prefer a more equal distribution of consumption (or disposable income) to a less equal one, 
ceteris paribus. Based on the policy rules for marginal income taxation derived in the context 
of this general model, we examined the implications of four more specific types of inequality 
aversion, two self-centered and two non-self-centered. The basic aims were to understand 
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how and why inequality aversion motivates marginal tax wedges in the labor market and how 
the Pareto-efficient marginal tax rate varies along the distribution of consumption. 
 
The take-home message of the paper is twofold. First, empirically and experimentally 
quantified degrees of inequality aversion have potentially very important implications for 
Pareto-efficient marginal income taxation. More specifically, three out of four models of 
inequality aversion show that the first-best efficient marginal tax rates required to internalize 
the externalities caused by inequality aversion are both substantial in size and vary 
substantially with respect to the consumption levels. Moreover, these models imply a 
progressive marginal tax structure in the sense that low income levels are subsidized at a 
diminishing marginal rate and high levels of income are taxed at an increasing marginal rate.  
 
Second, both the exact nature of the inequality aversion and measures of inequality used 
matter a great deal for the structure of efficient marginal income taxation. The most striking 
result comes from comparing the two models of self-centered inequality aversion, with 
seemingly similar consumer preferences. Whereas the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) type of 
inequality aversion implies monotonically increasing marginal income tax rates, with high 
negative marginal tax rates for low-income individuals and high positive tax rates for high-
income individuals, the often considered similar inequality aversion model by Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2000) implies close to zero marginal income tax rates for all. The intuition is that 
the consumption externality caused by inequality aversion is non-atmospheric in the former 
case and atmospheric in the latter. 
 
Future research may take several directions and we shall briefly mention three of them here. 
One path would be to consider a second-best framework with asymmetric information, 
preferably in a discrete-type self-selection model. Such an extension would integrate 
inequality aversion into the modern theory of optimal income taxation. Another would be to 
include a broader set of policy instruments. For instance, since inequality aversion leads to 
(private) consumption externalities, it is likely to have implications also for the efficient 
provision of public goods and the public provision of private goods. A third avenue would be 
to allow for a broader spectrum of social interaction, where the policy implications of 
inequality aversion are examined alongside the implications of other types of (empirically 
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established) forms of interaction such as relative consumption concerns and/or social norms. 
We hope to address these questions in future research.      
 
Appendix 
 
Proof of Lemma 1 
Start by rewriting equation (6) to read 
 
max
min
( , , ) ( , , )
' ( ) ( ) ' ( )
c
c
u c z C u c z C C
f c f c f c dc
c C c
  
  
 
  
.              (A1) 
By combining equations (A1) and (7) we get 
 
max
min
( , , )
' ( )
1
( )
c
c
cz
u c z C C
f c dc
C c
w MRS
f c


 
 
 

.               (A2) 
Next, substitute the private first-order condition for work hours in equation (4) into equation 
(A2) to obtain 
  
max
min
( , , )
'() ( )
'( ) 1 '( )
( )
c
c
u c z C C
f c dc
C c
T wl T wl
f c


 
 
  

.              (A3) 
Substituting (8) into (A3) and using the MRS definition gives 
 
max
min
( , , )
'( ) 1 '( ) ' ( ) ( )
c
cz
c
MRS u c z C
T wl T wl WTP c f c dc
z



 

.              (A4) 
Finally, using  
( , , )
/ '
u c z C
w
z
 



 
from equation (7) and 1/ (1 '( ))czwMRS T wl   from equation (4), and then substituting into 
equation (A4), we obtain (9). QED Equation (10) follows as the special case where 
   1 '( ) / 1 '( ) 1T wl T wl   . 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
By using equation (11), we can derive  ( , , ) / ( , , ) /u c z C C u c z C c     , implying  
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1
( )
( )
C
MWTP c
f c c



.                 (A5) 
For c c it follows that / ( )C c f c    and 
( )MWTP c  .                 (A6) 
Thus, all individuals with a consumption level lower than c  will on the margin be willing to 
pay the same amount,  , per consumption reduction unit of an individual with consumption 
c . Similarly, when c c it follows that / ( )C c f c     and  
( )MWTP c   .                 (A7) 
Therefore, all individuals with a consumption level higher than c  will instead be willing to 
pay   per unit consumption increase of an individual with consumption c . 
 
Substituting equations (A6) and (A7) into equation (9) directly yields equation (13). QED 
 
Proof of Corollary1  
Substituting equations (A6) and (A7) into equation (10) yields 
max
min
'( ) ( ) ( ) Rank( ) (1 Rank( ))
( )Rank( )
cc
c c
T wl f c dc f c dc c c
c
   
  
    
   
 
.              (A8) 
QED 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
When the marginal tax rates are ow, it follows from equation (10) that 
 
max
min
2
( , , )
1
'( ) ( )
( , , )
c
c
u c z C
CT wl c f c dc
u c z Cc
c




 .                (A9) 
Instead, if based on the more general equation (10) we obtain  
 
max
min
2
( , , )
'( ) 1 1
( )
( , , ) 1 '( )1 '( )
c
c
u c z C
T wl Cc f c dc
u c z Cc T wlT wl
c


 

 ,             (A10) 
which is also the same for all, implying that (A10) reduces to (A9) and hence to equation (16). 
QED 
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Derivation of equation (18) 
From equation (17) follows that 
2
( , , )
1
1
u c z C v
c
c
C

 

   
       
,              (A11) 
and 
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1
1
1
u c z C v
C C C
c
C


   
  
     
       
.             (A12) 
Equations (A11) and (A12) imply 
2
( , , )
2 1
( , , )
u c z C
c cC
u c z C c c
c


            

.              (A13) 
Substituting equation (A13) into equation (16) gives equation (18). QED 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Equation (19) implies 
( , , )
( , , )
u c z C
cC
u c z C G
c


  


.               (A14) 
By using 0.5 /G D c  and 
0 0 0
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
c
c
D f c f c c c dcdc f c f c c c dcdc
  
       ,            (A15) 
we obtain  
 
0 0 0
0
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2Rank( ) 1
c
c
c
c
f c f c c c dcdc f c f c c c dcdc
D
c c
f c f c dc f c dc f c c
  

 
    
  
 
 
    
 
   
 
.            (A16) 
We can then derive 
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and 
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 
.             (A18) 
Substituting equation (A18) into equation (9) yields equation (20). QED 
 
Proof of Corollary 2 
If the marginal income tax rates are small, equation (20) implies 
 
 
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QED 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
By using /C c , we obtain  
max
min
2
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c
c
C c
c c c c c
c c f c dc
f c
c c c
f c c c
c c
 



  
 
  
 
  
 
  

 
  
 

.             (A20) 
Equation (8) then implies 
( , , )
1
( )
( , , )
u c z C
c cCMWTP c
u c z C c c
c



      

.             (A21) 
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By using equation (19), the marginal utilities of c and C become (with the measure of 
inequality given by the coefficient of variation) 
 
( , , )u c z C v
c c
c
c





   
   
     
      
 
and 
1
( , , )u c z C v
c
C c
c
c





 
   
   
     
     
. 
We obtain the following marginal rate of substitution: 
1
( , , )
( , , )
u c z C
C c
u c z C c
c




       

.               (A22) 
Substituting equation (A21) into equation (A22) gives 
 
2
1
( )
c c
MWTP c c
c


 
  
 
.              (A23) 
Substituting equation (A23) into equation (9) yields equation (22). QED 
 
Proof of Corollary 3 
When all marginal tax rates are low, it follows from equations (10) and (A23) that 
max
min
2 2
1
'( ) ( ) 1
c
c
c c c c
T wl c f c dc c
c
 
 
    
      
   
 ,             (A24) 
which can be rewritten as equation (25). QED 
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